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The Supreme Court has refused permission for Shamima Begum, who left the UK
as a 15-year-old British schoolgirl for Syria in 2015, to come back to the UK so that
she can effectively challenge the removal of her citizenship (decision dated 26th
February 2021; [2021] UKSC 7). Begum was found in a camp in Syria two years
back. The Home Secretary removed her British citizenship soon thereafter, arguing
that she has eligibility for Bangladeshi citizenship, and would not be left stateless
without British citizenship.
Now the unanimous decision of five judges of the Supreme Court is widely reported
to be a win for former home secretary Sajid Javid who had stripped Begum of her
citizenship. Yet, is it really a vindication of this action? It is important to recognise
that the decision of the Supreme Court is not based on a factual assessment of
Begum’s case but only on whether she has to be given permission to return to the
UK to participate in an effective and fair manner in the immigration appeal. A limited
decision, and by no means a final adjudication on Begum’s deprivation of citizenship
case, is what is now available for analysis.
Fair Trial?
Those who are concerned about fair trial and other human rights are deeply
disappointed at the manner in which the decision declares that fair trial is subject
to public safety while staying Begum’s appeal in the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC). In para. 135 the Supreme Court, distinguishing itself from the
Court of Appeal, observes that “…. if a vital public interest – in this case, the safety
of the public – makes it impossible for a case to be fairly heard, then the courts
cannot ordinarily hear it”. Applying this to Begum’s situation, the Court suggests that,
“[t]he appropriate response to the problem in the present case is for the appeal to
be stayed until Ms Begum is in a position to play an effective part in it without the
safety of the public being compromised. That is not a perfect solution, as it is not
known how long it may be before that is possible. But there is no perfect solution to a
dilemma of the present kind”.
Indeed, this is a far cry from a perfect solution. In the coversheet to the judgment,
we find a note on which point 3 is: “The steps taken on behalf of the Secretary of
State and Her Majesty’s Government to facilitate Ms Begum’s involvement in the
deprivation appeal, as described in the Witness Statements of Lauren Cooper dated
12 October 2020 and 5 November 2020, shall be confidential and no party or other
person shall publish or disclose the same.” Given that confidentiality, in the interests
of national security, permeates each aspect which could potentially relate to the
issue of fair trial, we are only given this tantalising glimpse into future possibilities but




Overall, fair trial, which was the mainstay of the Court of Appeal’s decision, is
perhaps surprisingly, not the focus of the legal analysis of this decision. The
pronouncements on fair trial appear superfluous as the bulk of the case is not about
fair trial at all. The complex legal issues in this case are about appropriate applicable
standards of review in various courts. Several paragraphs unpack the separate
issues which come to the highest court of the land via appeals but through different
pathways. Two of the proceedings are brought in the Supreme Court by the Home
Secretary but one is brought by Begum in a cross appeal. Some of the proceedings
originate in judicial reviews and some in appeals. Some of the proceedings relate to
the decision of the Minister to cancel Begum’s citizenship (on a limited aspect) while
others are about the refusal of leave to enter (LTE) which is an immigration decision.
Begum would require LTE for returning to the UK to challenge her deprivation order
so both deprivation and LTE refusal are linked but distinct legal issues. In Begum’s
cross appeal the judges were also clear that just because there may be lack of
fairness if she is not present in the UK, Begum cannot automatically win her SIAC
appeal solely on that basis. This was the weakest element in Begum’s case and
perhaps it dragged down the other issues.
Judicial (Self) Restraint
Despite the permutations and combinations of the pathways, subject matter, and
person raising the issues in question, the Supreme Court arrives at a strangely
uniform view on judicial oversight over decisions in the area of deprivation matters in
all instances. In every consideration it appears the court is of the view that it, or any
other court (SIAC, Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal), cannot fully review the
Home Secretary’s decision making. What this decision is then, in effect, is not any
major pronouncement on right to nationality (or restrictions on it), statelessness (or
its cross-links with citizenship), human rights issues (as connected to citizenship) or
even on how counter-terrorism matters should be reviewed when there are issues of
human rights at stake. Instead, it is a paean to judicial (self) restraint which renders
the Supreme Court, and all the other courts with any involvement in this matter of
Begum, impotent on the issue of review of ministerial discretion and action through
its highly restrictive approach.
In order to justify why an appeal, which ordinarily has a more expansive remit than a
judicial review proceeding, cannot adopt a close scrutiny of the deprivation decision,
Lord Reed relies on an understanding that a proceeding which is called an appeal
is not necessarily one in which an appellate review (full merits review) will always
take place (para. 69). Here the subject matter is of critical importance according to
Lord Reed. The Supreme Court opines that appeals, such as of the nature in which
the SIAC is engaged in, can be restricted by inherent limitations to review powers
such as those placed on courts by separation of powers. Courts have to respect
executive authority in matters of national security and thereby rely on the discretion
of the Home Secretary. Further, the Supreme Court drew on unreasonableness as a
standard of review for exercise of ministerial discretion. Unreasonableness is much
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maligned for its restrictive nature in administrative review, sets a very high bar for
any challenge. To use this standard, especially in the context of rights which are of
an absolute (or not limited) nature such as Art 2 and Art 3 of the ECHR is a death
knell for human rights in the context of national security.
SIAC and Review
In the past, SIAC has rarely engaged with full factual analysis, at least in rulings
which it makes public. My own research has shown how several human rights
issues, such as the right to life, right to be free from torture and right to family
life have not been fully evaluated on their merits by SIAC. However, now such
issues are even less likely to be agitated in the SIAC as the Supreme Court judges
disagreed with the Court of Appeal on the role of the SIAC in national security
matters. The Court of Appeal had reminded SIAC that it is an appeals court which
should conduct a full review by assessing all the facts in a case itself, rather than
relying on the decisions of other courts or bodies. But the Supreme Court decides
that the SIAC could not do so in the current instance. Not surprisingly, in this
situation, the Home Secretary becomes the sole custodian of the details of decision-
making and evidence based on which action has been taken.
No Precedent Value
Many more legal twists and turns are still likely in Begum’s case but now is an
opportune moment to raise a question which is surely relevant: how would any
person challenging a ministerial decision in the context of counter-terrorism,
where they are excluded from the factual scenario because of national security
reasons, gain enough information about the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of a ministerial decision or action? The exceptional framing of the case where no
particular facts of Begum’s situation are revealed means its applicability to future
cases is limited.
It is for this reason that this decision, despite coming from a unanimous bench
at the highest court of this land, is unlikely to have much precedent value as it
seems very much related to the new circumstances the government is likely to have
presented to the court for potentially satisfying fair trial requirements in the future.
Such circumstances, not on record for open justice, can hardly be generalisable to
other cases where again similar issues may arise. And given the manner in which it
leaves fair trial rights hanging, that is the best possible legacy of this case. It is far
worse if this case is now cited for its pronouncements on fair trial in future cases.
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